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Among the most striking industrial phe-
nomena in the wake of the North American Free
Trade Agreement has been the rapid growth of
plants that operate under Mexico’s maquiladora
program. In its simplest organizational form, a
maquiladora plant imports inputs—typically
from the United States—processes them, and
then ships them back to the country of origin,
perhaps for more processing. The maquiladora
program permits the inputs and the machinery
to process them to enter Mexico tariff-free. On
the goods’ return, the shipper pays duties only
on the value added by manufacture in Mexico.
1
Although maquiladoras have operated in
Mexico since the 1960s, their output and em-
ployment growth began to accelerate markedly
with the advent of NAFTA in 1994 (Figure 1).
Over the first six years after the onset of NAFTA,
maquiladora employment grew 110 percent,
compared with 78 percent over the previous six
years. NAFTA opponents and supporters as well
as others have concluded that the trade agree-
ment was the cause of this sharp acceleration.
Balla (1998, 55), for example, claims that “with-
out doubt, NAFTA has resulted in a dramatic
increase in activity in the maquiladora industry.”
San Martin (2000, 32A) maintains that “NAFTA
continues to drive the growth of the maquila-
dora industry.” Carrada-Bravo (1998, 8) argues
that  “the acceleration of foreign direct invest-
ment under NAFTA also contributed to the crea-
tion of more than a half-million new employ-
ment opportunities in the U.S.–Mexico border
region.…These new jobs, tied to the expansion
of the maquiladora industry, [pay more] than
those not related to international trade.” A post-
NAFTA report produced jointly by the Economic
Policy Institute and the U.S. Business and Indus-
try Council Educational Foundation (1997)
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claims that “as new and expanded plants are
completed in the maquiladora zone…the bilat-
eral trade deficit should soar ever higher.” Even
before NAFTA took effect, Perot and Choate
(1993) declared that “the flow of U.S. companies
voluntarily moving factories to Mexico under
the maquiladora program threatens to become a
flood under NAFTA.”
2
MAQUILADORAS ARE NOT NEW AND NEITHER IS
THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THEM
Despite the consensus of commentators
who otherwise typically disagree, there are at
least as many reasons to suspect NAFTA did not
cause the maquiladoras’ growth as there are to
suspect it did.
3 Certainly, maquiladoras have
seen other episodes of sudden acceleration,
albeit unlike the recent one.
Mexico developed the maquiladora pro-
gram in response to the 1964 cancellation of a
U.S. program that, starting during World War II,
had admitted Mexican agricultural workers into
the United States for temporary employment.
Maquiladoras were to provide an employment
alternative in the manufacturing sector for
braceros, the agricultural workers who had lost
their jobs when the U.S. program ended.
The maquiladora plants in Mexico became
controversial in the United States as quickly as
they appeared. Some commentators complained
that while most of the braceros had been men,
most of the newly hired maquiladora workers
were women. However, the crux of the contro-
versy was not so much jobs for women in
Mexico as it was jobs for anyone in Mexico.
Maquiladora opponents argued that the pro-
gram helped U.S. and other firms take advan-
tage of low Mexican wages. As firms that had
employed low-skilled workers in the United States
set up operations in Mexico, opponents argued
that maquiladoras were “taking American jobs.”
Maquiladora supporters contended that if
these assembly plants had not located in Mexico,
they would have gone to other low-wage coun-
tries—in many cases, in Asia. Indeed, it was
pointed out, lower-wage Asian countries had
served as export platforms for U.S. manufactur-
ing operations before maquiladoras came on
the scene.
4
More to the point, the maquiladoras of
Mexico reflected a broader phenomenon, the
globalization of manufacturing. Although the
maquiladoras were creatures of Mexican law,
similar operations could be found across the
globe, thanks to decades of falling communi-
cation and transportation costs. These cost re-
ductions facilitated the development of a far-
flung network of assembly plants early on in
Taiwan—and later in Guatemala, Mauritius, and
Vietnam—whose products were marketed in
the industrialized world in general and in the
United States in particular (Grunwald and
Flamm 1985; Romer 1993).
This globalization process was not a result
of NAFTA. If anything, NAFTA was a result of
this globalization process. If the reductions in
communication and transportation costs that
motivated globalization had not occurred, the
political pressures that permitted NAFTA would
not have been so strong.
HAS NAFTA MADE MAQUILADORAS 
ANY DIFFERENT?
While NAFTA may have motivated compa-
nies to start or expand operations in Mexico, it
is also possible it discouraged maquiladora ex-
pansion or even discouraged maquiladora oper-
ations in general. This is because NAFTA allows
U.S.–Mexico production-sharing operations in
the maquiladora mode but without the maquila-
dora program.
By 1999 the majority of imports that had
been processed under the maquiladora program
and then entered the United States could enter
duty-free outside that framework. The Auto-
motive Products Trade Act and duty-free treat-
ment of certain products from most-favored-
nation suppliers, as well as tariff eliminations
under NAFTA, made entry as easy as it was
under the maquiladora program (Watkins 1994).
And because of the additional paperwork the
maquiladora program required, using it as a
vehicle in the age of NAFTA might seem un-
necessarily costly.
Another disincentive to operating under the
program involved environmental restrictions. In
some cases, waste-handling and treatment regu-
lations may be interpreted as stricter for maquila-
doras than for other Mexican plants making the
same products. Under NAFTA some of these
plants could export to the United States under
levels of protectionism no higher than what the
maquiladoras enjoyed, making maquiladora
participation an unnecessary expense.
5
Beginning January 1, 2001, moreover,
NAFTA became the only basis for duty-free
treatment of imported inputs to Mexican ma-
quiladoras, effectively ending the maquiladora
program as it related to trade among North
American countries. As of that date, NAFTA pro-
visions phased out unconditional duty-free
treatment for imported components and equip-13 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 2001
ment for maquiladoras. They also imposed rules
requiring North American content minimums
(50 percent or, in some cases, more) for duty-
free movement of products between Mexico
and the United States or Canada.
On the other hand, although NAFTA began
lowering tariffs on goods shipped into the
United States from Mexico upon its inception on
January 1, 1994, the full reductions were not
instantaneous. To the extent that other tariff
schedules resulted in lower duties on Mexican
imports than NAFTA did, the maquiladora could
have remained attractive.
6
Some NAFTA-related changes unequivo-
cally encouraged maquiladoras. Echeverri-Carroll
(1999) notes, for example, that NAFTA elimi-
nated all Mexican programs that favored specific
industries. When this occurred, some firms
switched to the maquiladora program to con-
tinue importing inputs duty-free to Mexico.
In sum, some factors suggest NAFTA may
have affected maquiladora growth a great deal.
Other factors offer reasons to suspect NAFTA
had little impact, and still others suggest the
trade agreement discouraged maquiladora
growth. Whether NAFTA significantly con-
tributed to the acceleration of maquiladora
employment growth is not easy to divine with-
out econometric testing. Nevertheless, the
maquiladora expansion rate during the six post-
NAFTA years is two-fifths again as high as dur-
ing the six pre-NAFTA years.
IF THE MAQUILADORA PROGRAM HAS BEEN PHASED
OUT, WHY ARE THESE QUESTIONS WORTH ASKING?
Analysts commonly credit NAFTA for all
post-NAFTA changes in U.S.–Mexico trade. (See,
for example, Council of the Americas 1999 and
Rothstein and Scott 1999.) Some econometric
evidence suggests that NAFTA explains a sig-
nificant portion of trade increases but that 
non-NAFTA factors have been responsible for
much of the U.S.–Mexico trade fluctuation 
since the agreement took effect (Gould 1998).
Other modeling efforts find that Mexican export
growth cannot be explained by NAFTA and that
the agreement’s role in Mexican import expan-
sion is unclear (Garces-Diaz 2001).
In any case, large blocks of economic activity
related to U.S.–Mexico trade—such as maquila-
dora production—have not been shown to be
either connected or unconnected to NAFTA.
Why is this important? If maquiladora produc-
tion and trade were linked to NAFTA, the impli-
cations for modeling NAFTA’s impacts would be
markedly different than if NAFTA did not influ-
ence a large portion of U.S.–Mexico trade. For
example, if maquiladora activity were unaffected
by NAFTA, perhaps estimates of the agreement’s
impact on U.S.–Mexico trade ought to exclude
data for maquiladora trade. 
This issue becomes clearer if we consider
the broader context of Mexico–U.S. trade.
Mexican shipments of crude oil to the United
States represent a significant portion of total
Mexico–U.S. trade, but they are clearly uncon-
nected to NAFTA. It may be possible to identify
other such goods. If it turns out that the portion
of NAFTA-affected Mexico–U.S. trade is rather
limited, the research focus on NAFTA would
also warrant greater limitations than are cur-
rently typical.
Suppose, however, that NAFTA has affected
maquiladora activity. Another interesting aspect
of examining the connections between maquila-
doras and NAFTA would involve assessing not
only whether NAFTA affected maquiladora activity
but how. For example, might NAFTA have only
directly influenced maquiladora activity? Or might
it have had indirect effects?
Finally, even though maquiladoras have
been phased out as a phenomenon separate
from NAFTA, the implications of such plants 
for trade liberalization related to NAFTA may
deserve very different modeling and policy con-
sideration if NAFTA motivated some kind of
behavior from them that the old maquiladora
rules did not. We can only measure these links
while it is still statistically possible to consider
maquiladoras as separate entities. Figure 2, which
shows the ratio of maquiladora to total Mexican
exports, demonstrates how important these im-
Figure 2
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plications may be. Note that maquiladora ex-
ports accounted for more than one-third of all
Mexican exports every year of the last decade. 
MODELING MAQUILADORA BEHAVIOR, 
WITH AND WITHOUT NAFTA
To test for NAFTA’s impact on maquila-
dora fluctuations, I apply a variant of a model
designed to explain maquiladora employment
(Gruben 1990). This model addresses influences
on fluctuations that would occur in the presence
or absence of NAFTA. The model includes adjust-
ments for statistical problems inherent in examin-
ing such relationships (Hernandez and Navarrete
Vargas 1988; Gruben 1990) and then adds a
dummy variable for all periods from 1994 on.
The virtue of this model is that it is very
parsimonious, yet accommodates both demand-
and supply-side explanations for maquiladora
employment fluctuations. To account for the
demand side, I use U.S. industrial production, as
Hernandez and Navarrete Vargas (1988) do. The
rationale for this is that maquiladoras are essen-
tially a segment of the U.S. manufacturing sec-
tor. When U.S. industrial production increases
(falls), maquiladora employment would also be
expected to increase (fall). (I also constructed a
version of this model using U.S. real gross
domestic product, since it is a broader measure
of both supply and demand. I do not report
these results because regardless of the configu-
ration of lag lengths or of the other variables in
the model, U.S. GDP never offered as much
explanatory power as industrial production.)
A second category of variable involves
relative wages, although, as explained below,
such variables require statistical adjustment be-
fore they are suitable for a regression equation.
Mexican maquiladora employment may be
expected to expand or contract inversely with
the ratio of Mexican manufacturing wages to
comparable wages in countries that compete
with Mexico in supplying products to the United
States, including the United States itself. In the
typical maquiladora model (Hernandez and
Navarrete Vargas 1988; Gruben 1990; Truett and
Truett 1993), the maquiladoras’ competitors are
plants in the United States and in newly indus-
trializing Asian countries. Ceteris paribus, as
Mexican manufacturing wages fall relative to
U.S. or Asian wages, Mexican maquiladora em-
ployment is expected to grow. 
I express all wages in dollars so as to char-
acterize relative costs from the point of view of
a U.S. producer or customer. This detail is
important. Why denominate foreign wages in
dollars when the workers will be paid in their
national currency? The reason is that maquilado-
ras are operated chiefly by U.S. firms or by for-
eign firms that use maquiladora products as
inputs for their U.S. operations. In either case,
these firms are selling to the U.S. market. They
attempt to hold down production costs in dollar
terms, regardless of where the actual production
takes place. So even though workers in a com-
pany’s foreign plants may be paid in the local
currency, the dollar value of these payments is
what’s important to producers trying to decide
whether to produce in Mexico, the United
States, or, for example, Hong Kong.
As an illustration, suppose workers in a
particular country received 200 pesos per day
yesterday and suddenly must receive 300 pesos
per day today. However, suppose also that this
increase is accompanied by a currency devalua-
tion such that while 10 pesos purchased a dol-
lar yesterday, 20 pesos must be exchanged for a
dollar today. This would mean a reduction in
the dollar cost of wages from $20 per day yes-
terday to $15 per day today. Naturally, U.S.
firms selling in the United States will suddenly
find operating in the peso-issuing country more
cost-attractive—even though workers now
receive 300 pesos per day instead of 200. 
Some may wonder why I (and all other
economists who econometrically model maquila-
dora behavior) use dollar-denominated relative
wages rather than some measure of output per
wage unit in dollar terms. For a maquiladora
owner, the output per wage unit a nonmaquila-
dora firm can generate may not be relevant.
This is because maquiladoras bring management
skills and economies of scale that may result in
much higher worker productivity than an aver-
age Mexican manufacturing plant employing
workers of the same skill levels—but without
paying wage differentials for the higher produc-
tivity.
7 Despite some skilled-labor shortages,
Mexico still has an abundance of low-skilled
labor whose productivity can be increased
through efficient management practices and
plant design. Unit labor costs offer little ex-
planatory power in maquiladora models, while
simple relative wages have much explanatory
power.
IS POST-NAFTA MAQUILADORA ACCELERATION
TIED TO NON-NAFTA VARIABLES?
An inspection of the three explanatory
variables discussed so far offers insight into 
why maquiladora employment accelerated after
NAFTA’s inception. Figure 3 displays U.S. indus-15 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 2001
trial production for 1975–99. Note the accelera-
tion in 1992 and in 1995. Over the first six years
of NAFTA, U.S. industrial production grows 32
percent, compared with 11 percent over the six
years before NAFTA.
Figure 4 shows the ratio of hourly Mexican
to U.S. manufacturing wages, both including
benefits and both expressed in dollars. Note the
sudden reduction in this ratio in 1995, one year
after NAFTA began. Although this ratio edges up
in succeeding years, it never goes above its levels
of 1991–94. According to the literature, these
lower wage ratios may be associated with
higher maquiladora employment.
Similarly, the ratio of hourly Mexican 
manufacturing wages to hourly manufacturing
wages in a sample of Asian countries (Hong
Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) also falls
suddenly in 1995 (Figure 5). Like the Mexico–
U.S. ratio, the Mexico–Asia ratio increases
slightly after 1995. But unlike the Mexico–U.S.
ratio, the Mexico–Asia ratio never rises to any
value reached before 1995. As with the Mexico–
U.S. ratios, lower Mexico–Asia ratios may be
associated with higher maquiladora employ-
ment.
8
The most recently published econometric
models of maquiladora behavior use data series
ending in 1988. Eleven years’ data are available
since the last model was estimated, so it is pos-
sible that relations between the independent
variable and dependent variables could have
changed.
9
Finally, to test for NAFTA’s impact on fluc-
tuations in maquiladora employment, I use a
dummy variable with the value of 0 for pre-
NAFTA years and the value of 1 for post-NAFTA
years. This variable is the most important of this
modeling effort. A positive and significant esti-
mated value for the NAFTA coefficient would
mean that San Martin (2000), Balla (1998),
Carrada-Bravo (1998), the Economic Policy
Institute and the U.S. Business and Industry
Council Educational Foundation (1997), and
Perot and Choate (1993) are correct that NAFTA
drives maquiladora growth. A negative and sig-
nificant estimated value for the NAFTA coeffi-
cient would signify that NAFTA discourages
maquiladora growth. This result would suggest
that the maquiladora-discouraging aspects of
NAFTA may dominate the maquiladora-encour-
aging aspects of NAFTA. If the estimate for the
NAFTA coefficient is insignificant, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the actual value of
the coefficient is zero, and so perhaps NAFTA
had no impact on the maquiladoras.
Figure 3
U.S. Industrial Production
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Figure 5
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PRELIMINARY STATISTICAL EXAMINATIONS
SUGGEST THE OLD RELATIONS STILL HOLD
Columns A through C in Table 1 present
the results of three simple regression equations,
each of which incorporates at least one Mexican
wage-ratio variable, plus the industrial pro-
duction index variable and the NAFTA dummy
variable. I use annual data beginning in 1975
and ending in 1999. With the exception of the
NAFTA dummy variable, all data are trans-
formed into first differences of their logarithmic
forms, so the data will be stationary.
10 Column A
reports a regression equation that includes the
U.S. industrial production variable (Industrial
Production) and (following Gruben 1990) one
lag of the Mexico–U.S. wage variable (Mex/US
Wage), together with the NAFTA dummy vari-
able (NAFTA Dummy). As expected, the indus-
trial production coefficient is positive and sig-
nificant. The Mexico–U.S. wage coefficient is
negative and significant. Note that the NAFTA
dummy variable is insignificant and negative,
the implications of which I discuss below.
Column B of the table offers an equation
with the same variables, except that the
Mexico–Asia wage ratio replaces the Mexico–
U.S. wage ratio. The results are essentially the
same, however. Industrial production takes on a
positive and significant sign. The Mexico–Asia
ratio takes on a negative and weakly significant
sign. The NAFTA dummy variable coefficient is
again negative and insignificant.
11
Even though the common approach to
constructing econometric maquiladora models
has been to account for both Mexico–U.S.
wages and Mexico-industrializing country wages,
an estimation problem usually develops. If I put
both wage variables in the same equation, typi-
cally neither passes a significance test, even if
they do separately. Sign changes also occur.
These problems may be seen in Column C of
the table, where both the ratio of Mexican to




CONSTANT .087811*** .077245*** .088691*** .080133*** .080674***
(.015193) (.015758) (.018936) (.011714) (.011988)
Mex/US –.132065** .00—– .141554 .00— .00—
Wage (–1) (.060174) (.131125)
Mex/Asia .00—– .108876* .010268 .00— .00—
Wage (–1) (.059248) (.125143)
Principal .00— .00— .00—– .014589* –.019336*
Components (–1) (.007566) (.010012)
Principal .00— .00— .00—– .013934* –.016974
Components (–2) (.007305) (.012390)
Industrial Production 1.049863** 1.131543** 1.051087** 1.278143*** 1.200418**
(.395894) (.401794) (.406940) (.389837) (.484877)
NAFTA Dummy –.019877 –.010857 –.020874 –.025703 –.025216
(.025985) (.027943) (.029329) (.022549) (.025341)
R
2 .534362 .504401 .534536 .737014 .747451
Adjusted R
2 .460840 .426148 .431100 .675134 .684314
Standard error of regression .051558 .053191 .052961 .040064 .040354
Sum of squared residuals .050507 .053757 .050488 .027287 .026056
Log likelihood 37.75743 37.04029 37.76173 42.39968 .00—
Mean dependent variable .118631 .118631 .118631 .121682 .120555
Standard deviation of .070217 .070217 .070217 .070291 .071823
dependent variable
Akaike criterion –2.935429 –2.873069 –2.848846 –3.399971 .00—
Schwartz criterion –2.737951 –2.675591 –2.602000 –3.152007 .00—
Durbin–Watson statistic 1.548164 1.434754 1.544536 2.027825 1.859293
*** Significant at the .01 level.
** Significant at the .05 level.
* Significant at the .10 level.
NOTE: Standard deviations in parentheses.17 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 2001
wages appear in an equation with U.S. industrial
production and the NAFTA dummy variable.
The t statistics for the lagged wage-ratio vari-
ables fall below the benchmark levels of signif-
icance. Moreover, the coefficient on the Mexico–
Asia wage ratio takes on a positive sign, even
though it is negative when the Mexico–U.S.
wage ratio is not in the equation. These weak-
ened results suggest the recurrence “of multi-
collinearity between the two variables that
express relative costs,” which appears in a simi-
lar maquiladora-related modeling exercise by
Hernandez and Navarrete Vargas (1988).
12 Move-
ments in the two wage variables are highly 
correlated; this correlation substantially reduces
the ability of regression analysis to separately
attribute variations in maquiladora employment
to a wage variable.
13
We have no direct method for correcting
multicollinearity problems beyond increasing the
number of observations. A procedure does exist
that allows for the weighting of the wage vari-
ables to avoid multicollinearity. 
Through principal components analysis,
the variation of several variables can be com-
pressed into one or more index variables,
known as a principal component. The principal
component is a linear combination of some col-
lection of variables, such as the two wage ratios
in this model. A mathematical procedure is used
to maximize the variation of each of the two
wage variables that can be captured in one
index. This suppresses the contaminating effects
of one wage variable’s correlation with the other,
and multicollinearity ceases to be a problem.
Through this maximization procedure, a
coefficient becomes attached to each original
variable. In this study, the wage-ratio variables
are the two original variables. The values of the
coefficients estimated for the variables in this
index indicate the relative importance of each
original variable in the new, derived component.
It should be noted that principal compo-
nents estimators are biased. So, unfortunately,
are the estimators derived from other proce-
dures to avoid multicollinearity problems—
including estimators in ridge regression. How-
ever, the focus of this model is to identify
NAFTA’s impact on maquiladora growth. Since
the NAFTA dummy variable has not been con-
verted into a principal component, the estimator
bias in the principal component portion of the
model will have little effect on the point of this
exercise. The relation between fluctuations in
U.S. industrial production—also not captured
through principal components—and maquila-
dora employment fluctuations is also unbiased. 
DOES NAFTA AFFECT MAQUILADORAS AFTER ALL?
MORE COMPLETE RESULTS
Having applied principal components esti-
mation to create an index variable that is free of
multicollinearity problems but captures both
Mexico–Asia and Mexico–U.S. wage relation-
ships, I use this variable to test for NAFTA’s
impact on maquiladora employment fluctuations.
The result I present (Column D of the
table) is the culmination of a large number of
prior estimations in which I tested for the opti-
mal set of lags. In estimating this model, I con-
structed alternative models that offered all pos-
sible combinations of lags from zero (that is,
contemporaneous) to three lags for the principal
component wage-ratio variable and for the
industrial production index variable (which,
again, is transformed into first differences of
logarithms). “All possible combinations” includes
asymmetric combinations.
14 I included up to three
annual lags for U.S. industrial production and for
the Mexican wage-ratio principal component.
Of all the equations I estimated, this one
has the lowest Schwartz criterion value (a model
with one and two lags of the Mexican wage
principal component variable, a contemporane-
ous U.S. industrial production variable, and a
NAFTA dummy variable).
15 As with the prelimi-
nary models in Columns A through C, the re-
sults in Column D do not support the claims of 
San Martin (2000), Balla (1998), Carrada-Bravo
(1998), the Economic Policy Institute and the
U.S. Business and Industry Council Educational
Foundation (1997), Perot and Choate (1993), or
of Perot in his television appearances in oppo-
sition to NAFTA and maquiladoras. (See note 2.)
The same is true for all models that I con-
structed but do not report here.
The Schwartz criterion offers information
about optimal lag length. The criterion punishes
overparameterization—or overloading the model
with lags of explanatory variables—more
severely than other lag-length criteria.
The winning Schwartz criterion model
offers an interesting picture of the dynamics of
maquiladora operation and management. First,
with the exception of the NAFTA dummy vari-
able, the Schwartz winner has no coefficients
with significance levels worse than .0735.
Coefficients are at least weakly significant, a
substantially better result than the previous
equations and a commentary on the ability of
principal components to capture collective vari-
ations. More interestingly, the Schwartz winner
has a first and second lag of the Mexican wage-
ratio principal component and a contemporane-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 18
ous coefficient of U.S. industrial production.
That this lag configuration is the Schwartz
criterion winner suggests that maquiladora man-
agement is typically less fretful about demand-
side risk than about cost or supply-side risk. As
for the demand side, note that the maquiladoras
respond within the same year to changes in 
U.S. industrial production. Other things equal,
maquiladoras add employees in the same year
in which U.S. industrial production goes up and
release them in the same year U.S. industrial
production falls. Note also that, according to
these results, a 1 percent increase (decline) in
U.S. industrial production is associated with a
1.278 percent increase (decline) in maquiladora
employment. 
The same Schwartz criterion winning lag
structure—with its one and two lags of the rela-
tive wage variable—suggests that managers take
two years to completely respond to shocks to
relative wages (supply-side shocks). The lag
configuration suggests that maquiladora man-
agement takes a good deal of time deciding
whether the wage shocks are transitory or will
be long-lived, even though responses to changes
in demand (that is, industrial production) are
relatively quick.
Maquiladora companies may need so
much time to adjust to a wage because of their
dollar-denominated (rather than peso-denomi-
nated) perspective on costs. When we express
all wages in dollars, the largest and most sudden
shocks to relative wages will involve currency
devaluations. The lag structure of the Schwartz
winner is consistent with maquiladora compa-
nies waiting to see if Mexican wages will adjust
to their old levels in dollars immediately after a
devaluation or if the adjustment process will be
a slow one. As Figures 4 and 5 show, the adjust-
ment was very slow in the wake of Mexico’s
1982 and 1994 devaluations. These devaluations
not only made the dollar value of Mexican
wages fall hard and fast (compared with U.S. or
Asian wages), but Mexican wages in dollar
terms remained depressed for years.
However, this peso-wage stickiness may
not be a certainty. First, it need not persist after
every devaluation. McLeod and Welch (1991)
show that in many countries this stickiness is
not typical and that relative wages return to their
old relations far more quickly than in Mexico. 
Second, the same investor pressures that
trigger Mexican devaluations can simultane-
ously trigger exchange-rate pressures else-
where. When a Mexican devaluation lowers
wage costs in dollar terms, maquiladora owners
may wait to see if devaluations will follow in
other countries where they own plants, eroding
the Mexican wage advantage. Mexico’s last
exchange rate crisis, in 1994–95, sparked capi-
tal outflows elsewhere in Latin America and in
the Philippines and Poland. The Russian deval-
uation of third-quarter 1998 created financial
pressures in Brazil and Argentina, as well as in
Mexico. Russia’s crisis triggered fears about
Brazil that were sufficient to cause large reserve
losses (Treuherz 2000). In the wake of these
losses, political events within Brazil incited fur-
ther capital outflows until Brazil devalued the
real in January 1999. The lag structure on wage
ratios is consistent with the time firms may wait
to see how these exchange-rate relations sort
themselves out.
With respect to the NAFTA dummy vari-
able, the conjectures of the authors who claim
NAFTA drove maquiladora growth are uncon-
firmed. The coefficient value for this variable
proves insignificant in every one of the scores
of equations I constructed in preparation for
building the model I present here. For the
authors mentioned, these insignificant coeffi-
cient values would offer cold comfort, in and of
themselves. However, the NAFTA dummy vari-
able coefficient also takes on a negative sign.
This, and the fact that every form of this model
gives a negative sign to the dummy variable
coefficient, means a coefficient value signifi-
cantly different from zero would reject those
authors’ claims even more soundly than insig-
nificance would. It should be reiterated that this
negative sign appears in every estimation I per-
formed, ranging from three lags of one variable
and no lags of the other, all the way to no lags
of the one variable and three lags of the other.
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES APPROACH
One last refinement is to deal with the
possible problem of simultaneity bias, which
arises because employment and wages are
jointly and simultaneously determined. 
Accordingly, a final step in estimating this
model is to substitute an instrumental variable
for the lagged principal components originally
included to adjust for the multicollinearity prob-
lems in the wage ratios.
16 A Hausmann test
shows that the instrumental variables model
uncorrected for heteroskedasticity is not statisti-
cally significantly different from the ordinary
least squares model. So from a statistical point
of view, there is no need to construct an in-
strumental variables equation. Nevertheless, in
Column E of the table, I present results for in-
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retical reasons to suspect simultaneity bias, even
if testing does not bear them out. As can be seen,
the first lag of the instrumented principal com-
ponent (wage-ratio variable) is negative and sig-
nificant, while the second lag is negative and
insignificant. As before, the industrial produc-
tion variable is positive and significant, while the
NAFTA dummy variable is negative and insig-
nificant. These results are so consistent with the
ordinary least squares results in Column D that
they add little to this narrative aside from offer-
ing assurances the OLS results are quite robust.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In response to widespread arguments that
Mexican maquiladoras’ rapid growth after
NAFTA was a result of NAFTA, I have performed
extensive econometric tests of its effect on
maquiladora employment. The results of these
tests are resoundingly negative. NAFTA did not
make maquiladoras grow faster. Such effect as
NAFTA had was negative, not positive, albeit
statistically insignificant. So we cannot say that
NAFTA had any effect on maquiladoras. 
Instead, the acceleration of maquiladora
employment growth from NAFTA’s inception
through 1999 can be explained by changes in
demand factors (as expressed by changes in the
U.S. industrial production index) and in supply-
side/cost factors (as expressed by changes in
the ratios of Mexican to U.S. manufacturing
wages and to manufacturing wages in four
Asian countries). Growth in the U.S. industrial
production index over the six years following
NAFTA was roughly three times as rapid as dur-
ing the six previous years. Likewise, Mexico’s
1994 devaluation meant that during the first six
years of NAFTA, the ratio of Mexican manufac-
turing wages to their counterparts in the United
States, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and
Taiwan was far below these ratios during the six
years before NAFTA.
The basic equation this article presents is
the culmination of many estimations. I present
the first- and second-lag configuration equation
because it has the optimal lag structure, based
on the Schwartz criterion. After adjusting for
degrees of freedom in the ordinary least squares
version, this equation captures 67.5 percent of
all variation in maquiladora employment; an
estimated 73.7 percent of variation is captured
before adjusting for degrees of freedom. After
adjustment, the instrumental variables version
captures 68.4 percent of total variation. 
The lag length has interesting implications
for how maquiladora owners handle risk. These
companies respond relatively quickly to
changes in demand (as expressed by changes in
the U.S. industrial production index), while the
response to shifts in relative wages does not
occur during the same year as the shift in rela-
tive wages (as expressed by changes in the
ratios of Mexican to U.S. and Asian wages).
Instead, these responses mainly occur one and
two years after the shifts, as if maquiladora
operators wait to see if the wage shocks are
going to be permanent. It is telling that in 2001,
following the period I model, maquiladora em-
ployment has fallen significantly as U.S. indus-
trial production has slid—validating my model.
While some evidence suggests NAFTA has
affected trade between the United States and
Mexico (Gould 1998), the effects were not
expressed through Mexico’s maquiladora sys-
tem. Trade is a complicated process, and so are
changes in trade policy such as NAFTA. 
NOTES
I wish to thank Eric Millis for his careful econometric
work and his valuable judgment and advice, Ana Prats
for organizing Table 1 and the figures, and Monica
Reeves for editing this article with great care.
1 Note that the return trip is not under the jurisdiction of
the maquiladora program. The tariff arrangements
involve U.S. law, not Mexican law.
2 One of presidential candidate Ross Perot’s television
props was a blowup of an ad inviting maquiladoras to
locate in the southern Mexican state of Yucatán. This,
Perot said, was what NAFTA would result in. 
3 Balla and Carrada-Bravo are pro-NAFTA. Perot and
Choate and the Economic Policy Institute and the U.S.
Business and Industry Council are anti-NAFTA.
4 The Border Industrialization Program, under which
Mexico’s maquiladoras began, was introduced by
Mexico’s secretary of commerce and industry after a
trip to East Asia. The program was his policy response
to what he had seen—labor-intensive assembly
operations, with East Asian workers employed in plants
that belonged to U.S. corporations and the same
import tariff arrangements that were later applied to
maquiladoras (Fernández-Kelly 1987, 151). 
5 See Boyer (1997) for a detailed characterization of
Mexican environmental law and its significance for
maquiladoras. 
6 Three general categories of U.S. tariff policy have
been applied to maquiladora products imported into
the United States. The first—Harmonization Tariff
Schedule 9802.00.60—permits the importation of
fabricated but unfinished metal products processed
abroad. Duties are assessed on the value added in
Mexico, rather than on the product’s total value. The
products must be processed in the United StatesFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 20
before being sent abroad and further processed in the
United States upon their return. The second category
—HTS 9802.00.80—makes an article assembled in
Mexico from U.S.-made components exempt from
import duties on the components. These products
need not have metal components. The third category,
now moot, was the most generous. If the goods
assembled or manufactured in Mexico had at least 35
percent Mexican content upon import into the United
States, they were eligible for duty-free treatment under
the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences, or GSP.
Mexico was removed from the list of GSP-eligible
countries when it joined NAFTA, but NAFTA allows
products the same immediate, duty-free entry as they
had under the GSP.
As a result of NAFTA, an additional Harmoniza-
tion Tariff Schedule was created. HTS 9802.00.90
allows for the duty-free treatment of textile and apparel
products assembled in Mexico from U.S.-formed and
cut fabric. Textile and apparel products have histori-
cally entered the United States under special trade
restrictions, so liberalizations of such trade have had
to be product-specific. For apparel that had entered
under 9802.00.80, only the value of U.S.-cut fabric and
U.S.-made fasteners such as buttons and zippers
came in duty-free. Under 9802.00.90, the value added
in Mexico—including labor and overhead—also enters
the United States duty-free. For additional discussion,
see U.S. International Trade Commission (1999).
7 On the issue of scale economies, note that the em-
ployment and output of the average Mexican manu-
facturing plant is smaller than that of the average
maquiladora or the average U.S. plant. In the wake of
Mexico’s 1994 devaluation, real manufacturing wages
adjusted downward and remained below predevalua-
tion real wages for years. In dollar terms, average
overall manufacturing sector wages in Mexico
remained below 1994 levels as late as 1999, the most
recent year for which data are available.
8 When I applied augmented Dickey–Fuller and
Phillips–Perrone tests to the variables discussed
(including the dependent variable, maquiladora
employment), none could reject the null hypothesis of
a unit root. I accordingly took first differences of
logarithms of these variables, which allows rejection of
this hypothesis in every case.
9 All three models cited here—Hernandez and Navarrete
Vargas (1988), Gruben (1990), and Truett and Truett
(1993)—use a Mexico–U.S. wage variable, a Mexico–
other industrializing country wage variable, and a U.S.
output variable.
10 See note 8 for an explanation of why I used first
differences. The wage data for all countries—Mexico,
Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and the United
States—are from the International Comparisons of
Hourly Compensation Costs for Production Workers in
Manufacturing series, on the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics web site, ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/
ForeignLabor/supptab.txt. These data go back to
1975. Again, note that the virtue of these data is that
they account for benefits as well as salaries. Maquila-
dora employment data are from the Mexican govern-
ment’s INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadística,
Geografía e Informática) web site, www.inegi.gob.mx.
U.S. industrial production data are from the Federal
Reserve Board. 
11 Although I do not report them here, the results are
essentially the same with or without the NAFTA dummy
variable. This variable does not affect the equation in
this configuration. 
12 Hernandez and Navarrete Vargas (1988, 225), my
translation. Their model is quarterly, rather than annual,
and uses wage data uncorrected for international
differences in worker benefits, unlike the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics data my model uses. Truett and
Truett (1993) avoid results consistent with multi-
collinearity by using a different dependent variable
than other authors. However, the dependent variable
they apply has been criticized on other grounds. 
13 Even when the data are transformed into first differ-
ences of logarithms, representing growth rates of the
Mexico–U.S. and Mexico–Asia wage variables, the
coefficient of correlation between the two is .8852. This
is substantive evidence of serious multicollinearity. In
contrast, the coefficient of correlation between the
transformed version of the Mexico–Asia wage ratio
and the similarly transformed (first differences of
logarithms) U.S. industrial production index variable is
only .0935. The coefficient of correlation between the
transformed version of the Mexico–U.S. wage ratio
and the transformed U.S. industrial production index 
is .1232. These last two, low degrees of correlation
suggest that the multicollinearity in the equations is
strictly in the wage-ratio variables. 
14 An example of asymmetry would be a contemporaneous-
only U.S. industrial production variable with three lags
of the principal components variable, or vice versa. 
I also ran symmetrically lagged models, with contem-
poraneity plus three lags of the industrial production
variable, along with (in the same equation) the same
lag structure for the principal components variable 
and so on. In so doing, I followed the London School 
of Economics paradigm of running every possible
combination (in this case, up to three annual lags).
15 The Schwartz criterion is one of the most common
tests for optimal lag specification. When testing
alternative lag structures for a model, the one with 
the lowest value wins.
16 The goal in creating instruments to proxy for the
original variable is to find variables that may be
correlated with the right-hand-side variable subject to
simultaneity bias, but not with the dependent variable.
In this case, a linear combination of the contempora-
neous peso–dollar exchange rate together with lagged21 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 2001
principal components was considered a reasonable
candidate for constructing an instrument for the
original component. When the Sargan test of instru-
ment validity was applied, the related F value was
0.3048, implying a .9024 level of significance, clearly
demonstrating the instrumentation was valid. 
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